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GOOGLE V. ORACLE AMICUS MERITS STAGE BRIEF: VINDICATING
IP’S CHANNELING PRINCIPLE AND RESTORING JURISDICTIONAL
BALANCE TO SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Peter S. Menell, David Nimmer, and Shyamkrishna Balganesh
Abstract
The Federal Circuit’s decisions in Oracle v. Google conflict with this Court’s seminal
decision in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), misinterpret Congress’s codification of this
Court’s fundamental channeling principle and related limiting doctrines, and upend nearly three
decades of sound, well-settled, and critically important decisions of multiple regional circuits on
the scope of copyright protection for computer software. Based on the fundamental channeling
principle enunciated in Baker v. Selden, as reflected in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, the
functional requirements of APIs for computer systems and devices, like the internal workings of
other machines, are outside of the scope of copyright protection even as non-merged aspects of
the implementing code for APIs are protectable. Google independently implemented the
functional specifications of the 37 APIs at issue and hence did not infringe Oracle’s copyrights.
By way of brief illustration, copyright protects artistic and literary works, such as a creative
metal sculpture or haiku. Nonetheless, the proprietors of those works cannot complain when
third parties replicate elements of that expression that are essential to the operation of a particular
machine. For instance, a car manufacturer could secure the ignition switch for its automobiles via
a metal key with an original cut pattern on the blade. Although that pattern might be protected as
a modern sculpture, the car manufacturer could not use copyright law to prevent others from
utilizing the same expression for the purpose of starting the car. The same consideration applies
to a car manufacturer that secures a digital ignition switch via entry of a haiku. Copyright law
does not bar third parties from utilizing the necessary expression of that otherwise protectable
literary work for the purpose of starting the car. The computer program implementing that digital
key may be protected by copyright law, but the law places no bar on copying the essential
functional elements needed to operate the ignition switch—the haiku text and any other
indispensable functional features of the computer program.
As Baker v. Selden recognized, copyright law’s limiting doctrines implement a
constitutional and statutory balance intended to promote progress by channeling functional
features exclusively to the utility patent regime. Although copyright can protect separable
expressive features, such as surface ornamentation of an ignition key or non-merged
implementing code of a digital ignition key, it does not bar the use of functional specifications—
the essential technological elements. Only utility patent law can protect those features.
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INTEREST OF AMICI1
The authors of this brief are professors of law
who study and teach intellectual property law. Their
interest in filing this brief is to promote faithful interpretation of U.S. copyright law.
Peter S. Menell is the Koret Professor of Law and
co-founder and director of the Berkeley Center for Law
& Technology (BCLT) at the University of California
at Berkeley. He holds a law degree and a doctorate
degree in economics. Professor Menell has authored
or co-authored more than 100 articles and authored,
co-authored, or edited 15 books, including leading
casebooks, intellectual property treatises (including
sections of NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT), and research handbooks.
David Nimmer is Of Counsel at Irell & Manella,
LLP and Professor from Practice at the UCLA School
of Law, where he regularly teaches copyright law and
related subjects. Since 1985, he has authored NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, maintaining up-to-date the treatise
originally published in 1963 by his late father, Melville
B. Nimmer.
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Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, amici represent that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than
amici made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. Petitioner and Respondent have consented in writing to the
filing of this brief and were given 10 days notice of amici’s intent
to file.
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Shyamkrishna Balganesh is Professor of Law and
Co-Director of the Center for Technology, Innovation &
Competition (CTIC) at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School. His research and teaching focus on the interplay of intellectual property law, innovation policy,
and the common law. He co-authored the portions of
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT relating to Baker v. Selden, 101
U.S. 99 (1879).
In Spring 2018, the HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW &
TECHNOLOGY published a Special Issue on copyright
protection for computer software focusing on Oracle v.
Google. The issue is framed by Professor Menell’s monograph-length lead article Rise of the API Copyright
Dead?, which explores the rich history, technology, and
legal issues surrounding this case. The Special Issue
includes commentaries prepared by counsel from both
sides of the litigation as well as leading academics.
Professor Nimmer’s treatise, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
has been cited extensively in the decisions below as
well as throughout copyright jurisprudence.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Federal Circuit’s decisions in Oracle v. Google
conflict with this Court’s seminal decision in Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), misinterpret Congress’s
codification of this Court’s fundamental channeling
principle and related limiting doctrines, and upend
nearly three decades of sound, well-settled, and critically important decisions of multiple regional circuits
on the scope of copyright protection for computer
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software. Based on the fundamental channeling principle enunciated in Baker v. Selden, as reflected in
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act, the functional requirements of APIs for computer systems and devices, like
the internal workings of other machines, are outside of
the scope of copyright protection even as non-merged
aspects of the implementing code for APIs are protectable. Google independently implemented the functional
specifications of the 37 APIs at issue and hence did not
infringe Oracle’s copyrights.
By way of brief illustration, copyright protects artistic and literary works, such as a creative metal
sculpture or haiku. Nonetheless, the proprietors of
those works cannot complain when third parties replicate elements of that expression that are essential to
the operation of a particular machine. For instance, a
car manufacturer could secure the ignition switch for
its automobiles via a metal key with an original cut
pattern on the blade. Although that pattern might be
protected as a modern sculpture, the car manufacturer
could not use copyright law to prevent others from utilizing the same expression for the purpose of starting
the car. The same consideration applies to a car manufacturer that secures a digital ignition switch via entry
of a haiku. Copyright law does not bar third parties
from utilizing the necessary expression of that otherwise protectable literary work for the purpose of starting the car. The computer program implementing that
digital key may be protected by copyright law, but the
law places no bar on copying the essential functional
elements needed to operate the ignition switch—the
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haiku text and any other indispensable functional features of the computer program.
As Baker v. Selden recognized, copyright law’s
limiting doctrines implement a constitutional and
statutory balance intended to promote progress by
channeling functional features exclusively to the
utility patent regime. Although copyright can protect
separable expressive features, such as surface ornamentation of an ignition key or non-merged implementing code of a digital ignition key, it does not bar
the use of functional specifications—the essential
technological elements. Only utility patent law can
protect those features.
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
As background for addressing copyright protection for the works at issue in this case, Section I reviews the jurisprudential and legislative framework
governing functional features of works of authorship.
Section II then explains the pertinent technical background relating to the Java application program interfaces (APIs) and Google’s implementation of a subset
of the APIs. With this background in place, Section III
exposes the Federal Circuit’s critical errors and explains that Baker v. Selden and the Copyright Act
enable software companies to develop interoperable
and partially interoperable software programs so long
as they independently implement prior developers’
functional specifications. It also discusses how the

5
Federal Circuit’s approach upends well-reasoned and
long-standing judicial decisions that have supported
innovation and competition in the computer industry.
Applying the proper interpretation of copyright protection for APIs to this case, Section IV confirms that
Google’s independent implementation of functional
specifications of the 37 APIs at issue did not infringe
Oracle’s copyrights. As a result, there is no need for the
Court to reach the fair use question.
I.

THE JURISPRUDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
FOR FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE

The intellectual property system has long addressed the interplay of the different modes of protection by establishing a clear hierarchical structure to
ensure fidelity to Congress’s goals in promoting both
technological and creative progress. The Patent Act requires the inventor or discoverer of a process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter to meet stringent threshold requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and disclosure in order to obtain 20 years of
protection. See PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY, &
ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGY AGE: 2019, Vol. I, at 16-26, 36-37, 156-68.
In this way, patent protection aims to promote pioneering and cumulative innovation by providing a relatively strong form of protection for a relatively short

6
duration. See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer,
Economic Models of Innovation: Stand-Alone and Cumulative Creativity, in BEN DEPOORTER & PETER S.
MENELL (EDS.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, VOLUME 1: THEORY
119, 120-50 (2019). The Copyright Act, by contrast,
merely requires that authors surmount a low originality threshold to obtain relatively long-term protection—now life of the author plus 70 years. See NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01, 9.10[A][1] (2019). But because
copyright protection is limited to the author’s original
expression and does not extend to any ideas, procedures, processes, methods of operation, concepts
principles or discoveries, it has far less impact on competition.
It would be nonsensical for copyright protection to
encompass functional features of works of authorship,
such as the gears and levers of a cash register (a sculptural work) or the functional specifications for a digital
cash register (computer software). Cash registers are
machines that fall squarely within the province of utility patent protection and have long been protected accordingly. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 271,363 (1883) (Cash
Register and Indicator). If copyright protection extended
to functional specifications of machines or processes, a
sculptor could protect the precise configuration of gears
and levers for a mechanical cash register or a computer
programmer could protect the functioning of a particular digital cash register (perhaps a spreadsheet) merely
by meeting copyright’s low originality threshold, thereby
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circumventing the patent system’s high protection
thresholds and relatively short duration.
This Court’s seminal decision in Baker v. Selden,
later codified in the text and reflected in the legislative
history of the Copyright Act, ensures that such illogical
circumvention cannot occur. The channeling principle
is clear: where functionality and expression inextricably coincide, copyright cannot subsist. Such elements
can be protectable only if they satisfy patent law’s
higher thresholds, and that protection lasts only 20
years.
This principle does not deny the creativity of functional sculpture and computer system design features.
Those elements may be highly creative. But when the
function and expression merge—even in a very specific
configuration—copyright protection must give way to
ensure the coherence of the intellectual property system. The idea-expression dichotomy, merger doctrine,
and other limiting doctrines (such as scenes a faire)
implement a constitutional and statutory balance intended to promote progress by channeling functional
features exclusively to the utility patent regime. Although copyright can protect separable expressive features, such as surface ornamentation of a physical cash
register or non-merged implementing code of a digital
cash register, it cannot extend to functional specifications—the essential technological elements. Only utility patent law can protect those features.
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A. Baker v. Selden (1879)
This Court enunciated the structural foundation
for the U.S. intellectual property system in Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). Accountant Charles Selden
devised a condensed ledger bookkeeping system for
government accounting. See CHARLES SELDEN, SELDEN’S
CONDENSED LEDGER, OR BOOK-KEEPING SIMPLIFIED
(1859). His new system consolidated the broad range
of county transactions into a single ledger. The preface
to Selden’s book proclaimed that this new system
would “greatly simplify the accounts of extensive establishments doing credit business” and handle “an almost infinite variety of transactions,” qualifying it “to
be classed among the greatest benefactions of the age.”
Id. It noted that “[i]n addition to the copyrights of this
little book, [Selden] has applied for a patent right to
cover the forms of the publication, and prevent their
indiscriminate use by the public.” Id.
In 1867, another accountant released BAKER’S
REGISTER OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS WITH BALANCE SHEETS AND REPORTS FOR COUNTY AUDITORS AND
TREASURERS, offering a similar accounting system with
some advantages that made it easier to use. By 1871,
Baker’s system was in wide use while Selden’s languished.
Selden’s widow sued Baker for copyright infringement. On appeal, this Court recognized that Selden
sought to monopolize use of the accounting system or
method explained in the book through copyright law,
thereby gaining an exclusive right in the use of similar

9
ruled lines and headings. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
at 101. While acknowledging that copyright law protected an author’s expression in conveying information
on the subject of bookkeeping, the Court ruled that
copyright protection could not extend to the “art”2 or
methods thus described:
To give to the author of the book an exclusive
property in the art described therein, when no
examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud
upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to an
invention or discovery of an art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of
the Patent Office before an exclusive right
therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured by a patent from the government.
Id. at 102; see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.05[A][2][a].
Justice Bradley illustrated the proposition by noting that although a physician could gain a copyright
in a book about his medical discoveries and treatments, protection could not extend to the new art,
manufacture, or composition of matter described in
the book absent a utility patent. Id. at 103-04. Likewise,
The copyright of a work on mathematical
science cannot give to the author an exclusive right to the methods of operation which
he propounds, or to the diagrams which he
2

In modern parlance, “art” refers to process. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(b); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
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employs to explain them, so as to prevent an
engineer from using them whenever occasion
requires. The very object of publishing a book
on science or the useful arts is to communicate
to the world the useful knowledge which it
contains. But this object would be frustrated
if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book. And
where the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams
used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are
to be considered as necessary incidents to the
art, and given therewith to the public; not
given for the purpose of publication in other
works explanatory of the art, but for the purpose of practical application.
Id. at 103-04. Baker v. Selden thereby established the
fundamental principle for channeling protection among
the intellectual property regimes. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07[B][2].
B. The Modern Statutory Framework
By the mid-1970s, the question of whether copyright protection extends to computer software emerged
as Congress was putting the finishing touches on the
overhaul of the 1909 Copyright Act. Rather than further delay completion of a legislative process that had
been gestating nearly two decades, Congress established the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”) to study the
implications of the new technologies and recommend

11
revisions to federal intellectual property law. Act of
Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873
(1974).
As a stopgap, Congress included computer software within the scope of “literary works,” one of the
classes of “works of authorship” covered by the Copyright Act of 1976. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1). The
House Report explains that
[t]he term ‘literary works’ does not connote
any criterion of literary merit or qualitative
value: it includes catalogs, directories, and
similar factual, reference, or instructional
works and compilations of data. It also includes computer data bases, and computer
programs to the extent that they incorporate
authorship in the programmer’s expression of
original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas
themselves.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 53-54 (1976) (emphasis
added). Other provisions of the 1976 Act endorsed
Baker v. Selden and codified traditional exclusions for
ideas and functional features. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(“In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work.”); id. at § 101 (definition of “pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works” excludes “mechanical
or utilitarian aspects”); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

12
§ 2A.06[A][1]. The legislative history further explains
that
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend
protection to the methodology or processes
adopted by the programmer, rather than
merely to the ‘writing’ expressing his ideas.
Section 102(b) is intended, among other
things, to make clear that the expression
adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that
the actual processes or methods embodied
in the program are not within the scope of
the copyright law.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 57 (emphasis added); S. REP.
NO. 94-973, at 54 (1975) (same).
After conducting extensive hearings and receiving
expert reports, a majority of CONTU concluded that
the intellectual work embodied in computer software
should be protected under copyright law, but subject to
the fundamental principle that copyright cannot protect “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery” and the Supreme Court’s foundational decision on the ideaexpression dichotomy in Baker v. Selden. See NAT’L
COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 1 (1979) (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b))
(“CONTU REPORT”). CONTU recommended two changes
to the 1976 Act, which Congress duly implemented. Act
of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3007, 3028
(1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2012)). Most
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importantly, the CONTU REPORT confirmed that while
“one is always free to make a machine perform any
conceivable process (in the absence of a patent), . . .
one is not free to take another’s program,” subject to
copyright’s limiting doctrines. See CONTU REPORT at
20 (footnote omitted). It further explained that:
The ‘idea-expression identity’ exception provides that copyrighted language may be copied without infringing when there is but a
limited number of ways to express a given
idea. This rule is the logical extension of the
fundamental principle that copyright cannot
protect ideas. In the computer context this
means that when specific instructions, even
though previously copyrighted, are the only
and essential means of accomplishing a given
task, their later use by another will not
amount to an infringement.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Thus, while recognizing important limitations on
copyright protection for computer software, including
the § 102(b) limitations, Congress intended that software programmers would garner protection for their
program design and coding choices to the extent that
the expression was separable from the underlying
ideas and functionality. That is, the functional specifications required for a computer to operate in a particular way would remain outside the scope of copyright
protection while the programmer’s implementation
of such specifications would be eligible for copyright
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protection. The general programming ideas, particular
requirements to achieve any function, and unoriginal
programming choices remain free for others to use
while the creative effort in particularized implementing code would gain protection. In this way, copyright
would stand in the way of piracy and slavish copying
without interfering with competition in machine functionality.
II.

APPLICATION PROGRAM INTERFACES
(APIs), JAVA APIs, AND GOOGLE’S IMPLEMENTATION OF A PARTIALLY INTEROPERABLE MOBILE PLATFORM3

An API is a software interface or communication
protocol between different parts of a computer program or system intended to simplify implementation
and maintenance of the software, control access to the
software or hardware, and/or facilitate development of
interoperable applications. See Application programming interface, WIKIPEDIA; Peter S. Menell, Economic
Analysis of Network Effects and Intellectual Property,
34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 218, 224-30 (2019) (“Network
Effects and IP”). An API can provide a feature or software library for a software system. APIs can thus function as high-level programming short-cuts that allow
programmers to more easily create applications that
3

This Section draws from Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API
Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection
of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 303, 347-75 (2018) (“Rise of the API Copyright
Dead”).

15
will interoperate with a system. Rather than programming a feature from scratch, a programmer can access
a pre-programmed feature by invoking the pertinent
API function calls. Thus, programmers can more easily
develop applications to run on a system by learning
the API function calls. See id. at 224 (“The technical
standards governing access to platforms, commonly referred to as application program interfaces (APIs) in
the software industry, play a critical role in consumer
and programmer adoption decisions, market entry, and
competition.”).
API packages function as the gears and levers of a
virtual machine. Declarations or function calls serve as
keys to unlock computing methods and operations.
A. Development of the Java Programming
Environment
In 1990, a small programming team at Sun Microsystems set out to develop a new general programming
language. The project evolved into an effort to create a
programmable device for television set-top boxes.
When Sun failed to interest consumer electronics or cable companies, Sun co-founder Bill Joy realized that
the effort could be re-purposed to program webpages,
the tantalizing new computing environment gaining
salience in Silicon Valley.
The team soon produced “Java,” a simple, lean,
platform-independent, real-time, embeddable, multitasking programming language for web functionality.
It used a similar syntax to the popular C programming
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language, but was more compact, efficient, and secure.
It enabled programmers to write “Java applets” (small
application programs) that could run on Apple, Windows, or UNIX machines without customization. It accomplished this versatility through the use of the Java
Virtual Machine (“JVM”), an intermediate layer of
software that checks the code and insulates end users’
computers from crashes and errors. Java enabled realtime interactivity, multimedia, and animation, which
greatly enhanced the dynamism of webpages.
Following the “ ‘profitless’ approach to building
market share” that Netscape had employed in giving
away its Navigator browser, Sun made the Java programming language freely available. See David Bank,
The Java Saga, WIRED (Dec. 1, 1995) (quoting Bill Joy,
“There was a point at which I said, ‘Just screw it, let’s
give it away.’ Let’s create a franchise.”). As part of its
effort to establish Java as the standard programming
language for the Internet and critical to its efforts to
prevent Microsoft from undermining Java’s “Write
Once, Run Anywhere” interoperability, Sun successfully pursued an open development path. See id.
Sun rolled out the first stable Java Development
Kit in early 1996 and continued to expand features
over the following year. The Java language comprises
words, symbols, and pre-written programs to carry out
various commands, such as printing something on the
screen or performing a basic mathematical calculation.
Sun organized sets of pre-written programs (methods,
which are grouped in classes) into API packages (or
class libraries). Each API package reflects a set of
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declarations or functional specifications needed to invoke the methods; it functions as a mini-machine for
performing particular pre-programmed functions. It is
executed through detailed implementing code. Although
Java programmers can write new code (methods) from
scratch, the pre-written methods within the Java API
packages provide convenient, efficient, reliable, standardized building blocks, thereby saving programmers
tremendous time and effort.
In 1998, Sun released the Java 2 Standard Edition
(“SE”) platform. It contained eight API packages, three
of which—java.lang, java.io, and java.util—were necessary to use the Java programming language. Sun
gradually expanded the number of API packages, classes, and methods. Sun also established the Java Community Process to enable users to participate in the
development of standard technical specifications for
Java technology. By December 2006, the Java SE 6
platform contained over 100 APIs. Although Sun made
the Java programming language freely available, it licensed the APIs under the General Public License
(“GPL”) that required users to make available any software incorporating the licensed code on a “share and
share alike” basis. See Network Effects and IP at 22728, 260-63. Sun also required licensees to ensure interoperability with the entire Java platform. See Rise
of the API Copyright Dead at 355.
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B. Google’s Android Implementation
As smartphones emerged in the early 2000s,
Google came to see that an open source platform for
mobile communications was critical to enabling mobile
devices to provide full web browsing capability. Building an open mobile communications platform, however,
posed substantial challenges. A new operating system
would need to be optimized for the small chips on
which handsets were based. The devices would have to
work in real-time. The platform had to be compact and
optimized to the particular functionalities consumers
would demand. In addition, the licensing model had to
balance openness with downstream competition and
innovation. Google did not believe that the GPL would
provide sufficient flexibility for the range of players
needed to establish a robust new mobile platform. In
particular, Google worried that the viral share and
share alike provision would discourage telecommunications companies and handset manufacturers (original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”)) from making
investments in innovative features. A more permissive
licensing model, in which downstream suppliers could
build proprietary extensions on top of the base platform, would better promote robust competition and innovation. See Network Effects and IP at 263-64.
Google’s Android team also believed that they
would need to create an application programming
environment that was familiar and easy to use. Java,
with its wide adoption and vast programmer community, was the obvious choice. They envisioned Android
“as the world’s first Open Source handset solution
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with built-in Google applications.” Android GPS
[Google Product Strategy]: Key strategic decisions
around Open Source at 2 (July 26, 2005), Trial Ex. 1,
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974,
975 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. C 10-03561 WHA). An open
source licensing model was critical to: (1) avoid the
fragmentation resulting from closed and proprietary
mobile platforms (like those offered by Microsoft and
Symbian); (2) provide telecommunications companies
and OEMs “a non-threatening solution for cross-vendor compatibility”; and (3) build a “community force
around Google handset APIs and applications.” Id.
Google engineers sought to use some of the Java
APIs, but did not want to include the full set because
of space and other design constraints. In addition, they
wanted to add new APIs to support GPS, camera functions, and user preferences. To provide access to a subset of Java APIs, Google planned to develop a clean
room implementation of the JVM and negotiate the
first open source Java 2 Platform, Micro Edition JVM
(“J2ME”) license with Sun. After a promising start, negotiations broke down when Sun refused to budge on
full interoperability with J2ME.
As a result, Google opted to build the Android operating system by emulating select Java API functionalities with independently written implementing code.
The “clean room” process draws on Judge Learned
Hand’s originality corollary: “if by some magic a man
who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s
Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if
he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem,
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though they might of course copy Keats’s.” See Sheldon
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (1936).
The microcomputer industry developed around this
principle. See Sony Comput. Entertainment v. Connectix, 203 F.3d 596, 599-608 (9th Cir. 2000); Comput.
Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 700, 707-10 (2d
Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,
1526-28 (9th Cir. 1992); Network Effects and IP at
259-60. One team of programmers studies a program
through legal means—such as by running the software
to study its behavior, reviewing documentation, peeling semiconductor chips, decompiling object code—to
determine its functional specifications. Those specifications are handed off to a second team of programmers
with no knowledge of the implementing code of the target computer program. They independently develop a
computer program with the same functionality as the
target program. See generally P. Anthony Sammi,
Christopher A. Lisy & Andrew Gish, Good Clean Fun:
Using Clean Room Procedures in Intellectual Property
Litigation, 25 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (2013).
If the Java programming language is analogized
to musical language, each API implementation can be
characterized as a record album featuring songs (methods). Java Standard Edition (SE) then functions like an
electrical-mechanical juke box, containing API record
albums from which programmers can choose particular songs by invoking declarations (song titles). The
fact that another juke box uses those song titles (declarations) to invoke a known song (method) is purely
functional: it does not copy a song (method), it merely
identifies a known song (method).
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Unlike the early software industry, which operated through trade secrecy and released only object
code versions to the public, Sun published the Java API
functional specifications (declarations) to encourage
others to develop applications. Even with access to the
functional specifications, emulating APIs can be difficult. During an arduous two year process, the Android
team independently developed its own implementing
code for 37 of the 166 Java API packages in Java SE
and an independent JVM. In this way, the Android operating system emulated the functionality of known
and tested APIs that fit the Android team’s design. Android’s use of the Java function labels (declarations)
enabled millions of Java programmers to quickly master Android app development. Although Android apps
were not fully interoperable with the Java SE platform, they were similar enough and better optimized
to the constraints of Android mobile devices.
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DECISIONS
CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT’S SEMINAL
RULING IN BAKER V. SELDEN, MISINTERPRET CONGRESS’S CODIFICATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW’S FUNDAMENTAL CHANNELING PRINCIPLE AND
COPYRIGHT’S LIMITING DOCTRINES, AND
UPEND WELL-REASONED AND LONGSTANDING JUDICIAL DECISIONS THAT
HAVE SUPPORTED INNOVATION AND COMPETITION IN THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
The unusual jurisdictional posture of the Oracle v.
Google case required the Federal Circuit to apply
Ninth Circuit law. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc.,
750 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Peter S. Menell,
API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and
Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1515, 1576–95 (2016). Although
we question the Federal Circuit’s fidelity to the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of copyright law, see Rise of the
API Copyright Dead at 427-43, this Court confronts
the interpretation of copyright protection for computer
software as a question of national law. As suggested in
Section I, we believe that this Court’s seminal Baker v.
Selden decision as later codified in the text and reflected in the legislative history of the Copyright Act
provides the necessary blueprint. In a nutshell, the
functional requirements of APIs, like the internal
workings of other machines, stand outside the scope of
copyright protection even as non-merged aspects of
the implementing code for APIs are protectable under
copyright law.
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A. The Federal Circuit’s Decisions Conflict
with Baker v. Selden
The Federal Circuit’s decisions directly conflict
with Baker v. Selden, and the idea-expression and merger doctrines that it spawned. By affording Oracle exclusive rights to not just the implementing code for
Java APIs but also the declarations necessary to call
those methods, the Federal Circuit has protected the
computer system’s functionality through copyright
law.
As Judge Alsup explained in the district court
opinion,
the rules of Java dictate the precise form of
certain necessary lines of code called declarations, whose precise and necessary form explains why Android and Java must be
identical when it comes to those particular
lines of code. That is, since there is only one
way to declare a given method functionality,
everyone using that function must write that
specific line of code in the same way.
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979
(N.D. Cal. 2012). Properly viewed, Sun’s devising of a
package (e.g., java.security) using a particular class
name (e.g., ProtectionDomain) and method name (e.g.,
ClassLoader) to effectuate a machine that responds to
particular inputs and produces particular outputs
should be deemed to place the otherwise creative
names and essential structure outside of copyright
protection, thereby enabling others (in the absence of
a utility patent covering this process or machine) to
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emulate (and interoperate with) this machine so long
as they write their own implementation. The Federal
Circuit has undermined those core principles.
B. The Federal Circuit’s Decisions Misconstrue the Copyright Act
Congress codified Baker v. Selden’s fundamental
channeling principle in the text of the Copyright Act of
1976. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Beyond the statutory text, the
legislative history states that “Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that the
expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the
actual processes or methods embodied in the program
are not within the scope of the copyright law.” H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1476 at 57 (1976) (emphasis added).4 CONTU
clarifies that “one is always free to make a machine
perform any conceivable process (in the absence of a
patent) [so long as one does not] take another’s program.” CONTU REPORT at 20 (emphasis added).5

4

The Federal Circuit omitted, without ellipses or explanation, the critical italicized completion to the quoted sentence. See
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d at 1367.
5
Courts have treated the CONTU REPORT as legislative
history for the Computer Software Act of 1980, amending the
1976 Act in accordance with CONTU’s recommendations. See
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260-61 (5th Cir.
1988); Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983). See generally NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.08[A][3].
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In accordance with the Copyright Act, Google was
entitled to make a mobile device (“a machine”) perform
the same functions as a Java API package (a “conceivable process”) with independently developed implementation code (i.e., not “another’s program”). Each
Java API package constituted a particular subsystem
within a larger particular computing environment.
Hence, Google was justified in selecting a set of Java
API packages and implementing them with original
code to create a new machine. See Rise of the API Copyright Dead at 433-52.
In support of its conclusions, the Federal Circuit
also misconstrued this Court’s observations in Mazer
v. Stein that “[n]either the Copyright Statute nor any
other says that because a thing is patentable it may
not be copyrighted.” Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750
F.3d at 1380. Contrary to the Federal Circuit’s decision,
this observation was made in relation to the overlap
between copyright law and design patent law. Mazer
states that “the Mechanical Patent Law and Copyright
Laws are mutually exclusive” and that it is only with
regard to design patent law that an overlap with copyright can occur. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 215 n.33
(1954). See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07[D][4][b].
Like copyright law, design patent protection is
subservient to utility patent law with regard to functional elements. The design patent statute was based
on England’s design copyright statute. See Jason J. Du
Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of American
Design Patent Protection, 88 INDIANA L.J. 837, 847,
854-73 (2013). The original bill proposed a “sole and
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exclusive copy-right” for the proprietor of any “new
and original design” for specified articles of manufacture. Ruggles Design Bill, S. 269, 26th Cong. § 1 (1841).
Following Senator Ruggles’ failed reelection bid, the
design protection mantle was taken up by Patent Commissioner Henry Ellsworth, which resulted in an unfortunate labeling twist. In his 1841 Commissioner’s
Report to Congress, Commissioner Ellsworth called
upon Congress to establish a design protection regime
under his authority at the Patent Office. See Thomas
B. Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent Protection in the United States, 30 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 380, 380-81 (1948). Although
bringing protection for designs under Patent Office administration, the substance of the bill remained the
same—protecting ornamental creativity as opposed to
technological advances. The 1902 Design Patent Act,
Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, § 4929, 32 Stat. 193 (1902),
on which the 1952 Patent Act rests, makes this abundantly clear. Under the 1902 Act, “Any person who has
invented any new, original, and ornamental design for
an article of manufacture” (emphasis added), may apply for a design patent.
Hence, the logic of Baker v. Selden applies equally
to design patents as it does to copyrights. To the extent
that an expressive feature of a design otherwise eligible for protection under either the Copyright Act or the
design patent provisions of the Patent Act is merged
or inextricably intertwined with a functional element,
it can only be protected under utility patent law.
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Accordingly, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on Mazer
was misplaced.
C. The Federal Circuit’s Decisions Revive
and Exacerbate Circuit Splits on Copyrightability, Merger, and Fair Use
Copyright protection for computer software got
off to an inauspicious start. See Rise of the API Copyright Dead at 322-26. In a case involving blatant and
cavalier piracy of entire computer programs, the Third
Circuit went overboard in addressing the defendant’s
interoperability argument, stating in dicta that “total
compatibility with independently developed application programs . . . is a commercial and competitive
objective which does not enter into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expressions have merged.” Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin
Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). Building
on that decision, the Third Circuit ruled, in distinguishing protectable expression from unprotectable
ideas, that
the purpose or function of a utilitarian work
would be the work’s idea, and everything that
is not necessary to that purpose or function
would be part of the expression of the idea.
Where there are many means of achieving the
desired purpose, then the particular means
chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence,
there is expression, not idea.
Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (emphasis in

28
original; citations omitted). In applying this rule, the
court defined the idea as “the efficient management of
a dental laboratory,” for which countless ways of expressing the idea would be possible. Id.
These decisions were roundly criticized. See, e.g.,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[F], at 13-62.34, at 13–4
(1991) (explaining that “[t]he crucial flaw in [Whelan’s]
reasoning is that it assumes that only one ‘idea,’ in
copyright law terms, underlies any computer program, and that once a separable idea can be identified,
everything else must be expression”); Donald S. Chisum, et al., LaST Frontier Conference on Copyright
Protection of Computer Software, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 15,
20-21 (1989); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope
of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1074 (1989). As this scholarship
emphasized, viewing the idea-expression dichotomy at
such a high level of abstraction produced an overbroad
scope of copyright protection because it resulted in all
implementations of the idea garnering protection. Furthermore, the Third Circuit’s misreading of merger
analysis and the idea-expression doctrine implicitly allowed copyright protection of procedures, processes,
systems, and methods of operation that are expressly
excluded under § 102(b). Drawing on this scholarship,
other circuits developed alternative approaches to the
scope of copyright protection that better comported
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with Baker v. Selden and related fundamental limiting
doctrines.6
Thus, after a rocky start, the regional circuit
courts of appeals implemented a balanced framework
for both protecting computer software against piracy
and interpreting the idea-expression doctrine to ensure that copyright law excludes functional features of
computer technology. Although the early overbroad
Third Circuit cases remained on the books, software
copyright law achieved stability, clarity, and sound reasoning. See Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix
Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (reinforcing and
extending Sega); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
6

See Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture Comput.
Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987) (declining to follow Whelan); Comput. Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,
705-06 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting dictum in Apple v. Franklin and
the Whelan Associates analytical framework, and applying an
abstraction-filtration-comparison framework based on Judge
Learned Hand’s classic mode of analysis in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)); Sega Enterprises Ltd.
v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
Whelan); Gates Rubber v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823,
834, 841 (10th Cir. 1993) (endorsing Altai); Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff ’d in
part, rev’d in part, 35 F.3d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994) (endorsing
Altai); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d
1335, 1341-43 (5th Cir. 1994) (endorsing Altai); Lotus Dev. Corp.
v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that
a menu command hierarchy that functions as a programming language is an uncopyrightable method of operation), aff ’d by an
equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); MiTek Holdings, Inc.
v. ARCE Engineering Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1559 (11th Cir. 1996) (endorsing Altai); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1375 (10th
Cir. 1997) (endorsing Altai).
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Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 534-37 (6th Cir. 2004)
(reinforcing this evolution); see generally Peter S. Menell, An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Protection of
Network Features of Computer Software, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 651, 707-08 (1998).
By the mid to late 1990s, the software engineering
community came to view high-level functions, labeling
conventions, and the functional specifications of APIs
as unprotectable under copyright law. See Brian
Profitt, The Impact of Oracle’s Defense of API Copyrights, ITWORLD (Aug. 23, 2011) (observing that “[h]istorically, APIs have been regarded as not falling under
copyright—the reasoning being that APIs are not creative implementations but rather statements of fact,”
but also noting the issue had been clouded by the distinction between “open” and “closed” APIs). The Federal Circuit’s Oracle v. Google decisions revived and
exacerbated the long dormant circuit splits relating to
copyrightability of particular elements of computer
software, copyright infringement analysis, and the application of the Copyright Act’s fair use doctrine. See
Michael Hussey, Copyright Captures APIs: A New
Caution for Developers, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 3, 2015).
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D. Reversing the Federal Circuit’s Oracle v.
Google Decisions Maintains the Coherence of the Intellectual Property System
and Will Restore Peace and Clarity to
the Computer Software Industry
Resolving this appeal through the clear and logical
principles underlying Baker v. Selden maintains the
coherence of the intellectual property system. The Supreme Court has reinforced these principles in its modern jurisprudence. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (observing
that Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of U.S. Constitution “reflects balance between the need to encourage innovation and
the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition
without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of
Science and useful Arts’ ”); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29-30 (2001) (“Where
the expired patent claimed the features in question,
one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must
carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is
not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely
an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the
device.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers,
Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) (cautioning against protecting functional features through trademark law); cf.
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539
U.S. 23, 34 (2003) (warning that “allowing a cause of
action under [Lanham Act] § 43(a) for reverse passing
off would create a species of mutant copyright law that
limits the public’s ‘federal right to “copy and to use” ’
expired copyrights”).
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Following the extensive litigation over copyright
protection for APIs from the early 1980s through the
mid-1990s, the regional circuit courts of appeals
achieved a balanced approach that afforded protection
for API implementations without hindering competition in the computer industry. The computer software
industry embraced that balance and was able to function efficiently for more than a decade. The Federal Circuit’s Oracle v. Google decisions cast a dark cloud over
standard industry practice. Restoring the clarity that
prevailed prior to the Oracle v. Google decisions will
promote innovation in an industry driven by complex,
time-sensitive decisions.
Reversing the Oracle v. Google decisions will not
deprive API developers of adequate intellectual property protection. They retain protection against companies that copy their implementation. Moreover, by
employing technological protection measures or distributing software products solely in object code form,
software developers can slow development of interoperable products. Reverse engineering computer programs is laborious, slow, and expensive. Even when the
functional specifications are publicly disclosed, as was
the case with the Java APIs, re-implementing that
functionality in a clean room is often costly and timeconsuming. And API developers can seek utility patents on technological innovations.
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IV. GOOGLE INDEPENDENTLY IMPLEMENTED
THE JAVA API FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THEREFORE DID NOT INFRINGE ORACLE’S COPYRIGHTS
The record in this case establishes that after the
Google-Sun negotiations over licensing the API implementations reached an impasse, Google undertook the
burdensome and costly effort to implement the APIs
independently. Although Oracle initially questioned
the independence of those implementations, it conceded that Google’s implementation did not infringe
the Java API implementations other than through the
copying of Java declarations and their structure, sequence, and organization. Inclusion of declarations
was necessary to achieve the particular API functionality. Unless Google used the precise declarations, Android could not emulate the functionality of the Java
APIs.
Like the labels and columns of Selden’s accounting
forms in Baker v. Selden, Java API declarations are not
protected by copyright because they are essential to invoke, access, unlock, or operate a particular system or
machine (specific Java API functions) even though the
particular implementation code for those functional
specifications is copyright-protected. To protect API
declarations through copyright law would afford Oracle patent-like protection over particular machine
functions.
To make this point concrete, suppose that Sega
had written its lockout code not as a peculiar sequence
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of data, Sega, 955 F.2d at 1516, but rather as an original haiku. Even though that haiku could be protected
if distributed as poetry, it would be barred from copyright protection as lockout code. That is the reason for
the Ninth Circuit’s unmistakable statement that the
“functional requirements for compatibility with the
Genesis [video game console are] aspects of Sega’s programs that are not protected by copyright. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b).” Id. at 1522.7 As essential “gears and levers”
for particular digital machines, the Java API declarations are not protectable under copyright law due to
the overarching channeling principles reflected in
Baker v. Selden and § 102(b) of the Copyright Act.
It is for that reason that it is irrelevant that the
Java APIs might be highly creative. So are haikus. But
if used to operate functional devices, their function
merges with the expression and copyright cannot limit
the functional use. Technological creativity is often
among the most difficult, imaginative, and praiseworthy forms of creativity. Yet the overarching intellectual
property system would be undermined if an inventor
of a better analog cash register could bar competition
7

That case simultaneously rejected Sega’s attempt to invoke
trademark laws to protect the lockout code that it voluntarily
adopted, namely “PRODUCED BY OR UNDER LICENSE FROM
SEGA ENTERPRISES LTD.” Id. at 1515. Having used that formulation, Sega could not complain when third parties similarly
employed it to gain the necessary access. Id. at 1528-30. As discussed above in § III(D), the coherence of the intellectual property
system disallows overly aggressive plaintiffs from deploying “copyright,” “trademark,” or any other label for the improper purpose
of excluding competitors from access to legitimate domains in order to achieve program compatibility.

35
for life of the inventor plus 70 years by copyrighting
the configuration of gears and levers as sculptural
works or if a computer programmer who devised a better digital cash register (e.g., a spreadsheet) could protect its invention for her or his life plus 70 years
through copyright protection for the functional specifications (declarations).
The Federal Circuit confused the infringement
analysis by accepting Oracle’s characterization of declarations as “declaring code.” But declarations are not
code but rather textual labels that specify properties of
an identifier. A declaration
declares what a word (identifier) ‘means.’ Declarations are most commonly used for functions, variables, constants, and classes, but
can also be used for other entities such as enumerations and type definitions. Beyond the
name (the identifier itself ) and the kind of entity (function, variable, etc.), declarations typically specify the data type (for variables and
constants), or the type signature (for functions);
types may also include dimensions, such as for
arrays. A declaration is used to announce the
existence of the entity to the compiler.
Declaration, WIKIPEDIA.
Nor do the API declarations attract protection on
the ground that their structure, sequence, and organization is protectable. Combinations of methods in a
machine are no more copyrightable than the configuration of tools in a Swiss Army knife. Moreover, these
labels are essential to accessing and operating a particular computing machine or method. The implementing
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code is protectable, but not the declarations or structure of declarations necessary to operate a particular
machine, method, or other functional component of a
machine.
V.

THE FAIR USE ISSUE IS MOOT

In view of the foregoing establishing that Google
did not infringe Oracle’s Java APIs copyrights, there is
no reason for the Court to reach the fair use question.
Cf. Rise of the API Copyright Dead at 471-73 (explaining that reliance on the inherently costly, timeconsuming, and unpredictable fair use doctrine is
ill-suited for resolving API copyright disputes).
------------------------------------------------------------------

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should
reverse the Federal Circuit’s 2014 and 2018 Oracle v.
Google decisions and rule that Google has not infringed Oracle’s Java API copyrights.
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